{"id":127,"date":"2013-04-22T13:28:17","date_gmt":"2013-04-22T21:28:17","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.android-decompiler.com\/blog\/?p=127"},"modified":"2018-12-19T13:41:44","modified_gmt":"2018-12-19T21:41:44","slug":"sms-spy-zertsec","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/sms-spy-zertsec\/","title":{"rendered":"SMS Spy ZertSecurity with decompiled, analyzed Java sources"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>The implementation of this Android malware is strong and clean. Nothing really innovative though.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.android-decompiler.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/0.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone  wp-image-130\" alt=\"0\" src=\"http:\/\/www.android-decompiler.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/0.jpg\" width=\"262\" height=\"416\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/0.jpg 436w, https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/0-188x300.jpg 188w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 262px) 100vw, 262px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Here&#8217;s a short summary:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span style=\"line-height: 1.714285714; font-size: 1rem;\">Masquerades as a German certificate installer app. The fake login\/pin is used to uniquely identify the phone (on top of the phone number and IMEI.)<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"line-height: 1.714285714; font-size: 1rem;\">Achieves SMS interception, most likely to break 2-factor authentication. There are 3 modes of operation: do nothing, intercept and proceed, intercept and cancel SMS broadcast.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"line-height: 1.714285714; font-size: 1rem;\">Multiple command-and-control servers. Two hard-coded domains are\u00a0hxxp:\/\/app-smartsystem.(com|net)\/sms\/d_m009.php<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"line-height: 1.714285714; font-size: 1rem;\">The C&amp;C urls can be updated, either by contacting the existing the existing C&amp;C, or via SMS sent by the master. Such SMS contain the string &#8220;&amp;Sign28tepXXX&#8221;.<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"line-height: 1.714285714; font-size: 1rem;\">The communication with the C&amp;C is encrypted using AES-ECB, with the static key &#8220;0523850789a8cfed&#8221;. The server also base64-encodes its payloads. (The client does not.)<\/span><\/li>\n<li><span style=\"line-height: 1.714285714; font-size: 1rem;\">The malware will try to start at boot time (BOOT_COMPLETED receiver), and also registers a 15-minute timer to query the server for updated C&amp;C urls.<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.android-decompiler.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/1.jpg\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-131\" alt=\"1\" src=\"http:\/\/www.android-decompiler.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/1.jpg\" width=\"864\" height=\"622\" srcset=\"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/1.jpg 864w, https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/1-300x215.jpg 300w, https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/1-624x449.jpg 624w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 864px) 100vw, 864px\" \/><\/a><\/p>\n<p>The APK was run through a name obfuscator. I&#8217;m attaching <a href=\"http:\/\/www.android-decompiler.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/SMSintercept_ComGuardSmart.zip\">the sources decompiled using JEB 1.1<\/a>, and with most of the refactoring\/renaming\/commenting work done. For JEB users, here is the <a href=\"http:\/\/www.android-decompiler.com\/blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2013\/04\/1cf41bdc0fdd409774eb755031a6f49d.apk_.jdb_.zip\">JDB file<\/a>. Enjoy.<\/p>\n<p>Sample MD5: 1cf41bdc0fdd409774eb755031a6f49d<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>The implementation of this Android malware is strong and clean. Nothing really innovative though. Here&#8217;s a short summary: Masquerades as a German certificate installer app. The fake login\/pin is used to uniquely identify the phone (on top of the phone number and IMEI.) Achieves SMS interception, most likely to break 2-factor authentication. There are 3 &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/sms-spy-zertsec\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">SMS Spy ZertSecurity with decompiled, analyzed Java sources<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[15,3,2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-127","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-android","category-decompilation","category-malware"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/127","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=127"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/127\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=127"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=127"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.pnfsoftware.com\/blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=127"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}